International Journal of Frontiers in Sociology, 2025, 7(4); doi: 10.25236/IJFS.2025.070402.
Wenjia Zhang, Yihe Lu, Ziyi Li
Law School, Southwest Minzu University, Chengdu City, Sichuan Province, China
This paper reveals the implicit exploitation of ride-hailing drivers’ right to rest through platform algorithmic mechanisms. Platforms present explicit incentives such as dynamic pricing and order-completion bonuses, while employing service score algorithms to quantify drivers’ labor into controllable data. This compels drivers into a self-exploitative state where they trade rest for higher income. Drivers’ working hours and withdrawal rules are manipulated by algorithms: high-price time slots induce excessive order-taking, and delayed withdrawal systems tie cash flow to continuous labor, intensifying economic dependency. Through data monopolies, platforms construct supply-demand profiles and use information asymmetry and psychological tactics to reduce drivers to mere algorithmic instruments. The study points out that measures such as algorithm transparency, flexible order limits, and withdrawal system reform are needed to balance platform efficiency with labor rights, safeguard fairness in the digital economy, and prevent technological power from eroding the autonomy of workers.
Ride-Hailing Drivers, Right To Rest, Algorithmic Exploitation, Algorithmic Management
Wenjia Zhang, Yihe Lu, Ziyi Li. Algorithmic Exploitation of Ride-Hailing Drivers' Right to Rest under Platform Incentive Mechanisms. International Journal of Frontiers in Sociology (2025), Vol. 7, Issue 4: 7-13. https://doi.org/10.25236/IJFS.2025.070402.
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